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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kevin Scott Dias appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction entered
pursuant to a conditional guilty plea following the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. In the district court, Mr. Dias asserted that, following a traffic stop, the search
of his car exceeded the scope of his consent when the officer asked to “just take a quick
look” in his car but then opened and searched his fanny pack, which was in the back
seat.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Mr. Dias entered a

conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to deliver, which preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress.

Mr. Dias asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion to

suppress, as the warrantless search violated his constitutional rights pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 18, 2014, Mr. Dias was stopped by Boise Police Officer Miller for failing
to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. (Tr. 9/3/14, p.2, L.18 – p.3, L.24.)1 Officer
Miller said that because Mr. Dias seemed nervous, he asked him to get out of his car.
(Tr. 9/3/14, p.8, Ls.4-10.) He then asked if he could search Mr. Dias, and Mr. Dias
consented. (Tr. 9/3/14, p.8, Ls.11-15.) After finding no contraband on his person,
Officer Miller told Mr. Dias to go back with him to his police car and take a seat on the

For purposes of the suppression motion, the parties stipulated to the facts as
presented at the preliminary hearing. (Tr. 3/27/15, p.5, L.11 – p.6, L.9.)

1

1

bumper. (State’s Exhibit 2 (Audio recording of the traffic stop (hereinafter, Audio)) at
13:10 – 13:20.) Officer Miller testified that he then continued to question Mr. Dias about
why he was nervous, and Mr. Dias told him that he had not had good interactions with
the police in the past. (Tr. 9/3/14, p.9, Ls.6-13.)
Officer Miller then asked Mr. Dias if he had anything illegal in the vehicle and
asked if he could “just take a quick look” to see if there was anything in the car.
(Tr. 9/3/14, p.18, Ls.1-5.) Specifically, Officer Miller said, “Is there anything in that car I
need to be aware of tonight man, no weed or nothing like that? Anything illegal? Is it
okay if I just take a quick look at it? Look inside? Is that cool?” (Audio at 13:35 –
13:45.) Mr. Dias said “Yeah.” (Audio at 13:40 – 13:45.) Once he had Mr. Dias’s
consent to “just take a quick look,” Officer Miller searched the car and opened a fanny
pack located behind the driver’s seat.
searching

through

the

contents

of

(Tr. 9/3/14, p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.16)
the

fanny

pack,

Officer

Miller

While
found

methamphetamine, spice, oxycodone, and drug paraphernalia. (Tr. 9/3/14, p.10, L.18 –
p.11, L.13.)
Mr. Dias was initially charged with three counts of possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver and one misdemeanor charge of possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.45-46.) He filed a motion to suppress the evidence in which he
argued that Officer Miller’s actions exceeded the scope of his consent because giving
an officer permission to “just take a quick look” does not “involve a touch, much less an
opening, of any containers in the vehicle.” (R., pp.82-84.) The district court denied the
motion. (R., pp.102-10.) It said, “Based on the context of the interaction between
Officer Miller and Defendant, a reasonable person would likely have understood that
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Officer Miller was going to search for ‘weed’ or anything ‘like that’ in the car.”
(R., p.109.) It then held that Officer Miller “did not exceed the scope of [Mr. Dias’s]
consent by searching the fanny pack, because: (1) a reasonable person would have
understood from the exchange that Officer Miller intended to search for drugs, and (2)
[Mr. Dias] did not limit the scope of his consent.” (R., p.110.)
Subsequently, Mr. Dias entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and one misdemeanor
charge.

(R., pp.116, 130; Tr. 4/30/15, p.51, L.19 – p.55, L.25.) The district court

imposed a sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction so that
Mr. Dias could participate in a Rider program. (R., p.131.) Mr. Dias filed a Notice of
Appeal that was timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.136-39.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Dias’s motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Dias’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court erred in denying Mr. Dias’s suppression motion because a

reasonable person would not understand that Mr. Dias’s consent to Officer Miller’s
request to “just take a quick look” in his car included consent for Officer Miller to search
the car and its closed containers. Therefore, the court’s conclusion that the search was
within the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent was in error. Furthermore, in this case, Mr. Dias
could probably not have objected to the scope of the search because Officer Miller told
Mr. Dias to sit on the front bumper of his police car during the search, so there was
likely no way for Mr. Dias to see what Officer Miller was doing. Therefore, Mr. Dias
could not have known when to object.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated

standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court accepts the
trial court’s determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews
“the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” Id. Thus, the Court
should review de novo whether the police officer’s actions were permitted under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution. State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 604 (Ct. App. 1993).

5

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Dias’s Motion To Suppress Because
A Reasonable Person Would Not Understand That Consent To An Officer’s
Request To “Just Take A Quick Look” In A Car Would Lead To A Full Search Of
The Car And The Contents Of Its Closed Containers
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section

17 of the Idaho Constitution protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. CONST.

AMEND.

IV; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 17 (emphasis added). The purpose of

this constitutional right is to “impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of
discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual’s privacy and
security against arbitrary invasions.” State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App.
2002). When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially
developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against
the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987)
(citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914)).
Searches or detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v.
Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129 (Ct. App. 2002). Consent to search, however, “is one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho
791, 796 (2003). The government bears the burden of proving a warrant was not
necessary. Id. And “the burden is on the State to prove . . . that the consent was given
and that such consent was knowing and voluntary.” State v. Harwood, 94 Idaho 615,

6

618 (1972)2 (citing State v. Douglas, 488 P.2d 1366 (Or.1971); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1968)) (Harwood abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130 (1983) as recognized by State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444,
447 (Ct. App. 1997)). Further, “when the basis for a search is consent, the government
must conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search.”

State v.

Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing United States v. Ward, 576 F.2d
243, 244 (9th Cir. 1978); Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1977).
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177
(1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). As such, like other consent issues, a
totality of the circumstances analysis is appropriate. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006).
In this case, the totality of the circumstances would not lead a reasonable person
to believe that Mr. Dias consented to a search of the containers in his car. First, Officer
Miller did not seek permission to thoroughly search the car’s contents. Rather, Officer
Miller simply asked Mr. Dias the following: “Is it okay if I just take a quick look at it?
Look inside? Is that cool?” (Audio at 13:35 – 13:45.) Mr. Dias said “Yeah.” (Audio at
Harwood preceded Shneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Bustamonte,
the United States Supreme Court held that “while the subject's knowledge of a right to
refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.” Id.
at 249. Bustamonte, however, did not eliminate the requirement that a person must
know what he is consenting to.
2
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13:40 – 13:45.)

The reasonable person observing this exchange would not have

understood that Mr. Dias’s consent to Officer Miller’s request to “just take a quick look
at” the inside of the car included consent to a thorough search of the car and the
contents of its closed containers.
Secondly, Officer Miller’s questions prior to asking to “just take a quick look” in
the car were not specific. They did not indicate that Officer Miller would conduct a
targeted search for drugs. Indeed, he asked a series of standard, general questions.
He asked: 1) if there was anything he needed to be aware of, 2) if there was “weed” or
anything like that, and 3) if there was “anything illegal” at all in the car. (Audio at 13:35
– 13:45.) These questions would lead a reasonable person to believe that when Officer
Miller asked to “just take a quick look” in the car, he was not specifically interested in
searching for drugs or anything else in particular. Reasonable people are obviously
aware that officers are always on the lookout for evidence of some crime. Thus, the
district court erred when it held that “a reasonable person would have understood from
the exchange that Officer Miller intended to search for drugs.” (R., p.110.)
Further, a “look” is not a “touch.” The definition of the word “search” is to “look
through or go over thoroughly to find something.”

The Oxford English Reference

Dictionary 1306 (Judy Pearsall and Bill Trumble, eds., Oxford University Press 2nd ed.
1996). The definition of the word “look” is to “use one’s sight; turn one’s eyes in some
direction.” Id. at 846. The definition of the word “quick” is “taking only a short time.” Id.
at 1182. And finally, used in this context — as an adverb modifying the word “take” —
the word “just” means “no more than.” Id. at 768. Thus, “just take a quick look at”
means to do no more than use one’s sight for a short time only. In fact, one of the

8

synonyms

for

the

word

“glance”

is

a

“quick

look.”

Thesaurus.com,

http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/glance (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). Therefore, the
reasonable person would believe that an officer asking to “just to take a quick look at”
the inside of a car would only be scanning the interior of the car for whatever is readily
observable.
A request to “just take a quick look” is not equivalent to a request to “search,” and
a holding to that effect in this case would irrationally extend the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Jimeno.

There, the officer specifically overheard Mr. Jimeno

arranging a drug transaction and later stopped him for a traffic infraction. Jimeno, 500
U.S. at 249. The officer then told Mr. Jimeno that he had reason to believe there were
drugs in Mr. Jimeno’s car and asked for consent to “search” the car, which Mr. Jimeno
granted. Id. The officer then opened a paper bag located on the floor of the car and
found contraband.

Id. at 250.

The issue was whether the scope of Mr. Jimeno’s

consent included a search of the paper bag.
The Court held, “In this case, the terms of the search’s authorization were simple.
[Mr. Jimeno] granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any
explicit limitation on the scope of the search.”

Id. at 251.

The Court found that

Mr. Jimeno’s consent was a “general consent to search” the car and held that, because
the officer told Mr. Jimeno that he thought there might be drugs in the car, a “reasonable
person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a
container.” Id. Therefore, the Court held that consent to “search” the vehicle “extended
beyond the surfaces of the car’s interior to the paper bag lying on the car’s floor.” Id.
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The Jimeno Court found that an unqualified consent to an officer’s request to
“search” is a general consent. Id. And, in that specific situation — where the officer has
reason to believe there are drugs in the car, and specifically asks about drugs — such a
general consent to search gave the officer permission to search closed containers. Id.
However, some courts have applied the rationale of Jimeno to situations where officers
do not ask to “search” but instead use another term. Those courts have held that
officers, after getting a person’s consent to “look and see” or “look through,” do not
exceed the scope of that consent when they perform a search and/or open containers,
so long as the officers indicate that the object of the search is drugs.3 This appears to
be based in large part on the fact that the Jimeno Court held that reasonable people
would know that drugs are often kept in containers, and “[t]he scope of a search is
generally defined by its expressed object.” Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982)).
But the Jimeno Court analyzed an officer’s request to “search,” not a request to
“just take a quick look at” the place to be searched. And, the request to search in
Jimeno came after the officer asked specifically about drugs he had a strong reason to
believe were in fact in the vehicle. As such, it was clear that the officer was searching
for drugs. The Jimeno Court did not hold, however, that as long as an officer mentions

See, e.g., State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 853 (Ct. App. 2000) (After asking whether
there were drugs in the car, officer asked defendant if he would mind if the officer took a
“look through” the defendant’s truck and then found drugs under the floor mat.); United
States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 868 (8th Cir. 2010) (Officer asked if defendant
had drugs in car and then asked “Do you care if I look and see?” The court held that
the officer “did not exceed the scope of Vargas–Miranda's consent by reasonably
searching the car for drugs.”).

3
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drugs to the driver in a random traffic stop, the scope of any consent is unlimited,
regardless of the ambiguity of the officer’s request for consent.
An officer’s use of terms other than “search” in a request to search increases the
likelihood that the request is ambiguous, and that any subsequent consent would be
limited to the words the officer used. A request to “just take a quick look at” the inside of
a car does not convey a request to open and explore the contents of closed containers
found inside the car.4 Thus, when an officer asks to do something other than “search,”
he does so at his own risk because any consent will be limited to the words the officer
used. If the officer does not limit his actions to those words, the consent cannot be
considered knowing and voluntary. Here, Officer Miller requested to “just take a quick
look.” Therefore, Mr. Dias’s consent was not general. In other words, the reasonable
person observing the exchange would believe that consent to Officer Miller’s request
would lead only a quick look, not a search.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.
2000), is instructive on this point.

In Wald, after stopping the car for a cracked

windshield, the officer became suspicious that the men in the car might be using drugs
and asked, “You wouldn’t mind if I take a quick look would you?” Id. at 1228. Wald
consented, and the officer looked in the interior of the car but found nothing. Id. at
1225. He then searched the trunk and noticed that the screws holding the speakers in
The “quick look issue” has prompted at least one recent law review article: Alexander
A. Mikhalevsky, The Conversational Consent Search: How “Quick Look” and Other
Similar Searches Have Eroded Our Constitutional Rights, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1077,
1086 (2014).
4
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place “were marked up.”

Id.

After opening the speakers, he discovered

methamphetamine. Id.
The court held that a “reasonable observer of this exchange would not likely
conclude that Wald gave [the officer] permission to search the vehicle’s trunk.” Id. at
1228. The same reasoning should apply here. Since Mr. Dias’s consent was clearly
limited by the nature of Officer Miller’s request, an observer of the exchange would not
conclude that the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent extended to containers found in the car
but rather only to readily observable items in the car. The questions asked by Officer
Miller would not communicate that, by consenting, Mr. Dias was giving Officer Miller
permission to search his personal containers. Indeed, the district court even went as far
as to say that it believed Officer Miller “should have been more precise with his
language by asking Defendant for permission to ‘search’ (nor is it an onerous burden on
police officers to be more precise when seeking consent for a warrantless search) . . . .”
(R., p.109.) Nevertheless, it denied Mr. Dias’s motion to suppress.
In its denial, the district court noted that there was no Idaho case law specifically
on point with this case. (R., p.106.) Therefore, the court relied on State v. Silva, 134
Idaho 848 (Ct. App. 2000) and State v. Jones, No. 36949, 2011 WL 11056704 (Idaho
Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2011) (an unpublished decision),5 to erroneously expand Jimeno to
include Mr. Dias’s situation.

(R., pp.105-06.)

However, Mr. Dias’s situation is

distinguishable from those cases.
In State v. Silva, the defendant filed a motion to suppress and argued that the

The district court also relied on several federal Circuit Court of Appeals opinions.
(R., pp.107-09.)

5

12

scope of his consent for the officer to take a “look through” his truck did not give the
officer permission to then search the cab of the truck and under the floor mats. Id. at
853. The Court of Appeals found that “a reasonable and prudent officer would have
viewed Silva’s consent as permission to search the entire cab, including under the floor
mats . . . .” Id. (citing State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522, 524 n.1 (Ct. App. 1999)).6 This
case is distinguishable from Silva for two reasons. First, the officer in Silva requested to
“look through” the truck, which connotes a more thorough inspection than a request to
“just take a quick look.” Second, the officer in Silva did not look in a closed container,
but under a floor mat.
The district court also relied on an unpublished Idaho Court of Appeals opinion,
which held that the Jimeno rationale applied to the search of a home: State v. Jones,
No. 36949, 2011 WL 11056704. (R., p.106.) In Jones, officers told the defendant that
they had received a call from someone saying that Mr. Jones was involved in the use or
sale of drugs, and one officer sought the defendant’s consent to search the home by
asking if it was okay if he “looked around.” Id. at *1. The defendant agreed, and the
officer looked in a closed container in a closet and found drugs. Id. The court held that
“a typical reasonable person would have believed” that, based on the entire
conversation, such consent gave law enforcement permission to search the entire
home, “including anywhere that drugs, the express object of the search, could be
hidden.” Id. at *4.
The facts of Jones are distinguishable from this case.

In Jones, the officer

specifically said that he had received a call that made him suspicious that Jones was

6

The court in Frizzel relied on Jimeno.
13

involved in the use or sale of drugs. In that respect, the facts of Jones were more like
those of Jimeno. Further, Jones did not involve a random traffic stop, as was the case
here. In Jones, the officer came to Mr. Jones’s house based on a tip that there were
drugs in the house. And, he asked to have a “look around.” Therefore, the reasonable
person may have been made aware that the officer would be performing a more
thorough examination of the premises for drugs. As such, Silva and Jones do not
support the denial of Mr. Dias’s motion.
The district court also erred in holding that, because Mr. Dias “did not limit the
scope of his consent” by objecting during the search, the search was within the scope of
his initial consent. (R., p.110.) The requirement to object, however, should only apply
to a situation where the person has given a general consent to search.

Wald

specifically addressed this issue. It stated,
As a general proposition, this court has determined that a defendant’s
“failure to object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a
more limited consent[ ] is an indication the search was within the scope of
consent.” That rule, however, applies only when the defendant initially
gave “a general authorization to search.” Here, the district court found that
Wald’s initial consent was not general, but rather was limited to a “quick
look inside the vehicle,” a finding we affirm as not clearly erroneous.
Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (citations omitted).
The same reasoning should apply here.

Once it is clear that a defendant’s

consent is limited because of the nature of the officer’s request, the defendant should
not need to further object to the scope of the search.
Furthermore, the district court did not inquire or make any factual findings with
respect to whether Mr. Dias could have objected.

He likely could not have in this

situation because Officer Miller told him to sit on the bumper of the police vehicle, so he
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almost certainly could not see what Officer Miller was doing in his car and would not
have known when to object. (Audio at 13:10 – 13:20.) As such, the district court erred
when it held that, because Mr. Dias did not object during the search, Officer Miller did
not exceed the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dias respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment of conviction and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 7th day of April, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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